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ABSTRACT 
The paper takes the approach that observed differences In firm 
size and market share may be explained by producers having access to 
different Information at the time of their Investment decisions. This 
view Is examined In a duopoly production model where each firm commits 
Itself to a production plan based on proprietary Information on future 
market conditions. The model ls used to analyze the effect of 
different Information structures on market conduct and performance. 
STRATEGIC COMMITMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY WITH 
PRIVATE INFORMATION 
I. Introduction 
The "New I.O. " is concerned with explaining how markets evolve under 
various types of strategic interaction between independent firms. Schelling's 
(1960) notion of precommitment i s  central to thi s  development. The idea i s  that 
a firm which makes irrevers·ibfo investments in plant capacity, for example, 
commits itself to large scale production later on. In taking this  action 
first, the firm guarantees a b i g  share of the market for itself, and it may 
even discourage competition from other firms in the future.1 Besi des ex­
plaini ng investment in capacity, the fi rst mover paradigm has also been 
employed to analyze advertisi ng, product selection, choice of location, and 
preemptive patenti ng and innovation as strategic market acti v ities. 2 The
recent review articles by.Di xit (1982) , Encaqua ( 1982), Salop (1978) and 
Schmalensee (1981 ) nicely describe the various models of strategic commitment. 
These models have been very helpful in forming the modern theory of 
industrial structure and in the application of antitrust law to shaping 
industri al structure. However, the first mover paradigm as it i s  normally 
presented i n  the literature is i ncomplete in that it does not specify how 
the first mover is selected. One would like a model whi ch endogenizes the 
order of play or a model that explai ns how the expost positioning of players 
in  strategy space evolves. One method adopted by Berman and SchBtter (1981) 
is to have the order of play determined as part of the super game equilibrium 
(assuming repetitious play) . 
An alternative approach adopted in this paper is  to assume that all 
firms may make strategic decisi ons at the same time, but that they are 
imperfectly informed about market demand when maki ng their deci sions. 
(Jovanovic ll981) makes a simi lar assumption in his model of location 
choice) . Specifically, in our model, firms decide on plant capacity i n  
period one before market conditions are known. Producers make their 
decisions on the basis  of private i nformation they receive in the form 
of a demand signal. In period two, firms choose a level of producti on 
contingent on the state of demand and thei r  plant size. Our analysis 
suggests that in making investment decisions some producers will elect 
to play it  safe, while others will charge ahead and commit themselves 
to establ ishing a dominant market posi tion. This scenario makes sense 
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if firms either have disparate information about the payoffs they will 
receive from the ensuing market game, or they process the same information 
in d i fferent ways. Players having an optimi stic view of the future will 
want to commit themselves to large scale producti on by building a big 
plant. Less opti mistic players will be more caut ious. Vi ewing this 
process, expost, after the firms have moved, we might attribute a fi rst 
mover advantage to one of the producers, when in fact, differences in  
i nitial beliefs and information would expla in our observation.3
In our analysis the information environment that firms operate in  
i s  all important in determining market structure and performance. The 
information that firms base their investments on is  described by three 
characteri stics (a) a producer's prior knowledge of demand before it 
receives its demand signal, (b) the precision of its demand signal and 
(c} the correlati on in signals between di fferent firms. One of our 
concerns in this paper is  to understand how exogenous demand uncertainty 
affects precommitment behavior, and to predict what degrees of accuracy 
and overlap in the private information that firms observe produce the 
largest differences in capacity and market shares, between firms. The 
other purpose of our study is to assess the private and social value of 
endowing producers with better information or allowing them to share and 
to act on common information. 
In Section II of the paper we present our model of strategic in­
vestment in capacity under imperfect information. For tractability we 
investigate a duopoly market where produce face an unknown linear demand 
function with quadratic production costs. The unknown demand intercept 
is normally distributed and each firm's knowledge of the distribution of 
demanded is updated based on a private signal that it receives talso 
normally distributed ) . In Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 we demonstrate that 
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there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which producers choose 
a level of cost-shifting investment contingent on their information. 
Section III explores the comparative static properties of symmetric 
equilibria in which firms receive identically distributed signals. The 
effects of increasing demand uncertainty on industry structure and per-
formance are summarized in Proposition 3.1. Propositions 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 
deal with the reactions of firms to receiving more accurate demand signals. 
Proposition 3.3 demonstrates that industry performance improves as the 
demand signals that firms receive become less positively correlated. The 
prospects for allowing firms to pool their information are assessed in 
Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 . 4
Section IV treats the asymmetric case i·n which firms differ in how 
knowledgeable they are. The private and social value from having one 
producer become better informed than another is characterized in 
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. 
Section V summarizes our findings and concludes with some 
speculations about expanding our analysis to the cases in which 
firms can acquire additional information at a cost and they can 
transmit information to each other.5
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II DERIVATION OF STRATEGIC COMMITMENT EQU ILIBR IUM 
Ila Assumptions and Notations 
We assume there are two firms in the industry. (Generalization to 
N firms is discussed in Section V). The equation for market price, P, 
as a function of the output of firms l and 2 denoted by, q1 and q2
respectively, is 
p = Cl. - ql - q2.
The demand intercept, o., is random, and its stochastic specification is 
discussed below. Revenue for producer i is given by 
( 2 .1 ) {Cl. - ql - q2) qi l, 2 
Let C{q;, Xi) be the cost of production for firm
(2.2a) c(qi, x. ) = 
(X, _ q. )2
l yqi + -' - l l' 2, 
It is defined by 
y > 0 
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One can think of Xi as a measure of "ideal" production capacity. By design,
unit production costs are minimized at output equal to Xi . The idea
behind (2.la) is that in period l firms commit themselves to a choice of 
Xi' by contracting for specified amounts of labor services, raw inputs, and 
capital equipment for use in production in period two. Deviations in 
production away from X. are costly to the firm because of the difficulty 
l 
of renegotiating contracts for the delivery of capital, labor and raw 
inputs. The cost of adjusting output will vary across industries. We 
could multiply the quadratic term in (2.2a) by a positive constant, 
ranging between zero and infinity to reflect the flexibility of the 
production process. However, we simply assume the constant is equal to 
one in What follows. 
Rewriting (2.2a) slightly we obtain 
(2.2b) C {qi, \ l (y - Xi) qi
2 2q. x. 
+ .....!.. + .....!.. 2 2 1 ' 2 
which suggests another interpretation for our model. We can regard Xi
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as an investment in a cost reducing device, where the cost of investment 
is X�/2.6 For convenience we will refer to Xi the strategic variable that
each firm chooses in period l as investment. The results to follow do not 
depend on which of the interpretations of cost (2.2a) or l2.2b) that one 
wishes to retain. 
Combining equations (2.1) and (2.2) and redefining o. to be net of 
the linear cost term y, we obtain the expression below for firm profits, 
(2.3) 
lX; - q.)
2
__ , 
2 l, 2 {o. - ql - q2) qi -Ili(qi, Xi) 
Before turning to the case where o. is random it is instructive to compare 
the differences in equilibrium investment and output for the deterministic 
case when it� and is not possible for firms to use prior investment to 
enhance their share of the market. 
IIb. Comparison of Commitment and Non-Commitment Equilibria 
In the noncommitment case, producers choose investment and output 
simultaneously. The firm's problem is to 
{2 . 4) maximize rri(qi. Xi )
xi· qi
1 . 2 
subject to the investment-output decisions of the other firms. It is 
easy to verify that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in this case where 
X� = q� = o./3.7 (The superscript " O" refers to noncommitment equilibrium
quantities) . 
In the commitment case each firm first chooses a level of investment. 
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Xi. knowing that producers will make an output decision later on contingent
on the value of X = ( x1 • x2 ) .  Producing at levels that differ from X i is 
costly for firm i. so that the choice of ideal capacity (or expenditure on 
cost reducing technology) is a credible way for firm i to bind itself to 
a specified range of production. We employ the perfect Nash equilibrium 
concept in analyzing this case; we assume each firm calculates it's expected 
production profits for given values of x. and this knowledge is rationally
used by the firms in making their original investment deoisions .8
To compute the commitment equilibrium we first calculate each 
firm's optimal output decision for given values of X .  Firm i's output
choice is the solution to 
( 2 .5 )  maximize Ili(qiXi)
qi
1 . 2 
where X; is regarded as being fixed in (2.5). Differentiating ( 2 . 5 ) 
with respect to qi (assuming an interior solution) yields two equations
in two unknowns which can be used to solve uniquely for firm 1 's and
firm 2's optimal production as a function of x1 and x2 .
t 2 . 6a ) 
(2 . 6b ) 
* a. 3X1 x2 ql = 4 + -8- - 8 
* a. 3X2 X1 q2 = 4 + -8- - 8 
The "*" superscripts denote commitment equilibrium quantities). 
Equation ( 2 .6) reveals that the strategic use of investment increases
a firm's own output while reducing the optimal production of its com­
petitor . 
Substituting for qi from (2. 6) into (2 . 3 )  we obtain an expression
for profits written in terms of the X's. 
( 2  . 7 )  ITi(Xi. Xj) = 1 �8 � 2o.2 + 360.Xi- 1 20.Xj- 1 8Xi Xj- 37X�+ 3X�J 
8 
t- j 
i , j = l .2 
Assuming each firm chooses Xi to maximize profits taking as given the
investment, x . •  of its competitor, we obtain (after some algebraicJ 
manipulations) that the Nash equilibrium commitment levels of investment 
are 
( 2 . 8 )  x* = 2mo. - * 1 z+m - X2 where m = 1 8 /37 . 
Upon substituting for these values of x1 and x2 in ( 2 . 6 )  we find that
the equilibrium commitment output levels are 
( 2 .9) * ql 
o.[2+3m]
4 ( 2+m )  
*q2
Table 1 below provides a summary of the commitment and noncommitment
equilibrium quantities i ncluding firm profits, TI,consumer surpl us, 
gCS, and total surplus, TS. 
Tabl e l 
Comparison of Alternative Equilibria 
Non Commitment Eq. Commitment Eg . 
q . 33a. .35a. 
x .33a. .39a. 
'IT . lla.2 . l Oa.2 
cs . 22a. 2 .24a.2 
TS .44a.2 .45a.2 
The table indicates that when commitment is  possible, there i s  excessive 
investment, expost, as each firm produces at a level l ess than its 
ideal capacity. Investment is necessary however for each firm to protect 
its share of the market. Predictably profits are less in the commitment 
equi libria because firms do not produce at peak effici ency, and the net 
revenue they earn from producti on only, is less than what they earn in the 
noncommitment equi librium. Consumers benefit from the larger production 
associated with the commitment equilibria, and total surplus increases 
. h" 11 lO in t is case as we . 
Ile Commitment Equilibria Under Uncertai nty with Pri vate Information 
Now we assume that firms make i nvestment decisions subject to 
some exogenous uncertainty about future demand or cost conditi ons. 
Producers' beliefs about future market conditions are captured i n  the 
form of a probabili ty distributi on for the intercept, a.. Each firm i 
recei ves some additional informat ion about a. in  the form of a si gnal 
9 
which contains the results of a market survey, or a forecast of future 
cost conditions, etc. Firm i can observe its own signal costlessly, 
but it can not acqui re any additi onal i nformation. We assume that each 
firm knows the mean and vari ance of its own si gnal, and the correlation 
(if any) between signal errors of different producers. Further 
knowledge of other players' prior beli efs about a. or the distribution of 
their si gnals is not requi red for our model . 
In peri od l each firm chooses a level of investment or capacity 
conti ngent on its signal. The s ignal recei ved by each firm i s  used to 
update their informati on about a. and to make inferences about the i nfor­
mation that other producers have acquired. In period two, the actual 
value of a. i s  revealed and the firms choose their  output to maximize 
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profits given the Xi's. In analyzi ng the model we employ a Bayesian
Equilibrium concept w i th the added requirement of perfectness. That i s, 
each player uses his knowledge of the second period production equi li brium 
along with the probability assessments of future market conditions to 
rati onally calculate his optimal choice of investment in period one. 
Bayesian Equilibrium requi res that each producer chooses an investment 
function to maximize expected profits, conti ngent on a model of how it 
expects its opponents to behave. Each player's perceived model, and 
the true model of its opponents' behav ior must coincide in equilibrium. 
The stochastic specificati ons of our model is as follows. There 
is  some exogenous uncertainty about the demand intercept (or the li near 
cost term y) which is reflected in a distributi on for a. which i s  
s pee i fi ed as 
( 2. l 0) (- 2 a. -v N a., oa.)
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I n  most of what follows we assume that fi rms know the actual pri or 
di stri buti on for a., gi ven by (2.10) though we will occasi onally relax thi s
by assuming that producers percei ve the vari ance of a. 
( Unless.we state otherwi se, o 2 = o 2 for i = 1, 2). a.; Cl 
2 2 to be a- 'f oa. . a.i 
Each producer
i ,  recei ves a si gnal, n. wfuich i s  rel ated to� by the equati onl 
(2.11) ni " a, + e:i 1, 2 
The noi se terms e:1 and e:2. are independent of a., and (e:1,e:2) has a
multi variate normal di stri bution with mean (0,0) and vari ance covari ance 
matri x  
matri x r 
01,2l 20 
l I e: 1 (2. 12) = ',: J ol ,2 
In (2.12) we allow for the possibility that signals di ffer i n  their 
degree of precision, and that although fi rms rece i ve separate si gnals, 
For future reference we note that, gi ven n i the condi ti onal expecta­
tions of a., and nj ' (j'fi )  are gi ven by (see DeGroot (1970; pp. 167 and
pp. 55)_12
( 2 .13) E(a.Jni ) = -;;:-+1.i (ni - �);
-
+ 
2cJ 
Cl 
/.. = -2- 2l 0 + 0 
El Cl 
2
o
a. + crl2 
l , 2 
(2. 14) E(n) ni ) = Cl Y. ( n . - -;;:-) ; l l y. = l 2
a + o 2 'f j e:l Cl l , 2 
Notice that the firms i n  our model obtain i nformati on which i s  unbai sed; 
on average they hold correct percepti ons about market conditions. Our 
model is  reasonably general i n  that i t  allows for players to possess 
di fferent degrees i nformati veness, to process i nformati on in different 
ways when their pri ors on a. are not the same, and to recei ve i ndependent 
or correl ated signal s about future market condi tions. Our assumpti on 
that i nformati on flows are normally distri buted greatly si mpli fies the 
analytics to fol low, and provi des a conven i ent way to characterize 
di fferent i nformation env i ronments by the vari ance-covari ance terms. 
One problem with the normali ty assumpti on i s  that i t  permi ts instances 
they may be stati sti cally related . When 012 > 0, the signal s may consi st when a. < o, and/or "l or n2 < o. For simpli city we assume interior
of i nformati on about demand drawn from similar consumer groups, for_ 
example. When a12 < 0, the i nformati on may be drawn from two populati ons
of consumers that are affected di fferently by a common event. 
solutions to the firm's maximization problems. Thi s means that we can 
end up w ith negati ve outputs or prices for certain reali zati ons of a., 
n1 and n2. Although thi s  i s  a conceptual problem, the probability
of its occurence can be made as small as once li kes by limiting the s ize 
of the vari ance terms. 
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To derive the equilibrium investment functions we first note that 
second period production contingent on given realizations of x1 and x2
is given by equation ( 2 .6 ) . As before, substituting for q1 and q2 from ( 2.6 )
in ( 2 . 3 )  yields the expression for profits as a function of given values for
x1 and x2 in ( 2 . 7 ) . Our equilibrium consists of firms choosing functions 
X . (n.)  to maximize expected profits conditioned on observ ing the 1 1 
signal n-· 
1 3 Formally, X .  ( n.)  is derived as the solution to 
1 1 1 
( 2 .  i 5) maximize 
Xi 1 28
[1 2E(a2in-l + 36E( �ln. ) X . - 1 2E ( aX.ln.)1 1 1 J 1 
2 2 J -1 8E( X.in.) X.-37X. + 3E( X . in-l J 1 1 1 J 1 
Assuming an interior solution to ( 2 .15), the investment functions
for firms l and 2 satisfy 
t- j 
l' 2 
1 3 
( 2  . 16a) X;( n1 ) = m [E(ain1 l - } E( X2 in1 ) J m = 1 8/37 
(2 .l 6b )  x2 (n2 ) = m [E(ain2 ) - t E( X1 ln2l J
For now we posit that each producer perceives that its opponent uses a 
linear investment rule. This is in fact true in equilibrium as we will 
verify shortly. The perceived rules are given by 
( 2 . 17a )  xl ( n l ) = ao + a l  n l
( 2 .  l 7b) X2(n2l = bo + bl n2
Bayesian equilibrium requires that each firm is aware of its opponent's 
rule for choosing X. In this case ( 2 . 1 6 )  and ( 2 . 1 7 )  imply
( 2 .  1 8a )  
( 2 .  l 8 b) 
x1 ( n1 ) = m [E(aJn1 l - -} [b0+b1 E( n2in1 lJJ 
x2 (n2 ) = m [E(a/n2l - } [a0 + a1 E( n1 ln2JJ 
Upon substituting ( 2 . 1 3 )  and ( 2 . 1 4 )  into ( 2 . 1 8 )  we obta in 
( 2 . l 9a ) x1 ( n1 ) = m [a+A1 /n1 -"Cl) 
2 
[bo+bl ( �+yl ( n1 -�lJJ 
( 2 .  l 9b) x2 ( n2 ) = m [a+A2 ( n2-�l - � [a0+a 1 ( "Cl + y2( n2-a) ]J 
Now for a Nash Equilibrium to exist, the perceived decison rules in ( 2 . l Z) 
must coincide with the actual decision rules given by ( 2 . 1 9 ) . According
to ( 2 . 1 9 )  this requires
( 2.  20a ) 
( 2.20b) 
ao+alnl = m [�+Al (nl- �) - l [bo+bl ( �+y1 ( n1 -�lJ] 2 
b0+b1 n1 = m [�+A2 ( n2-"Cl) -} [a0+a 1 ( "Cl+y2 ( n2-"CXJ J] 
1 4 
for all values of n1 and n2 . There exists a unique set of values (a 0 , a1 ,
b0 , b1 ) that satisfy
(2 . 1 9)  so that we have establ ished: 
Propos ition 2.l Given our assumptions , there exists a Bayesian Nash  
equ ilibrium characterized by ( 2 . 1 9) where 
( 2 .21) 
m mp,l - 2A2Yl)al = 2 l -m Y1Y2 
4 
- m - 2- m-( a0= mCt.( l -y1 ) - 2Ct.( l -J.2 ) + m  Ct.( l -y2 ) a1 -2Ct. l -y1 ) b1
( l -m2 ) 
4 
and b1 and  b0 are defined symmetrical l y .  
1 5 
It is now apparent why we invoked the as sumptions of l inear demand 
quadratic costs and normal ity; together they al l ow us to d erive  linear 
cl osed form sol utions  for the equil ibrium investment functions . It 
shou l d  be apparent from our development above that in fact l inear 
decis i on rul es occur in equil ibrium whenever any l inear updating rul es 
are u sed for processing new ihformation . 
Furthermore, it turns out that the Bayesian equil ibrium is unique . 
To d emonstrate this we fol l ow the same l ine of proof as in Nov shek and 
Sonnenschein ( 1 982 , p p .  21 6 ) . * * * * * * Let x1 l n1 J = a0 + a 1 n1 , x2tn2)= b0 + b1 n2
'\, '\, 
and su ppose x1 tn1 J and x2(n1) are other inves tment rul es . Su ppose
'\, '\, X1(n1) is best aga inst  X2( n2J .  Then according to ( 2 . 1 6 )  we have
'\, 
(2 . 22) xl ( n1)
Su btracting 
'\, 
(2.23) X1(n1) 
= m [E(Ct.in1) - } E �2(n2ln1� 
Xi (n1) from both sides of (2.22) and using ( 2 . 1 6 )  yields
* m ["' * l x1(n1) = - 2 E x2(n2in1) - EX2(n2in1lj 
- � [E{(�2(n2l - x;(n2lln1l] 
Now it is apparent that 
( 2 . 24) max 
"ll 
'\, * 
I xl ( n l l - xl ( n1 l 
'" * 
< I max ix2(n2l - x2(n2ll
"2 
'\, '\, 
16 
But repeating the same argument, assuming x2(n2l is best against  x1 ( n1 l 
(2 .25) 
we o btain 
'\, '\, '\, 
max Jx2(n2l - X* (n2ll� � max IX1(n1) - x2(n1ll
n2 2 n1 
'\, * To gether ( 2. 24 ) and ( 2.2 5 ) imply Xi(nil = Xi (nil so that we have
establ is hed: 
Proposition 2 . 2:  Given our  a ssumptions,  the Bayesia n  Equil ibrium 
c haracterized by ( 2 . 20 ) and ( 2 . 21 ) is unique . 
The empirical predic tions  of  our model are examined in d etail in 
Sections III and IV. However, there are a few quick observations worth 
noting at this poin t. First , it is e asy to v erify that expected firm pro-
fits are not nec es saril y increasing w ith firm size as measured by inv est-
ment or outpu t .  The reason is that X i and qi are typical l y  increasing
functions of  the firm's signal , Tl;· A h  igh val ue  of  n; wil l be good news 
to firm i because  it wil l im ply a l arge demand on average . However, if demand 
is l arge, it is l ikely that firm j wil l al so receive  an optimistic signal , 
and that they wil l inv est and produce on a l arge scal e whic h  wil l reduce 
firm i ' s  profits. Given these two opposing forces,  it is not general l y  
possibl e t o  determine the net impact o f  more optimistic signal s o n  conditional 
ex pected profits . 
Second , a n  interesting featu re of our model is that variations in 
the stochastic environment produced by changes in a2, a2 , a2 anda £1 £2 
o1 ,2 have no effect on  equilibrium inv es tment and output in an
expected val ue sense . This property is due  to our l inear decision 
rul es . Pass i ng the expected val ue operators , through equati on ( 2 . 20 ) 
we obta i n  
( 2 . 26a ) 
- - m -Enl 
x1 ( n1 ) = a0 + a1 u = m a  - 2 ( b0 + bl a )
( 2 . 26b) En X2 ( n2l2 
b0 + b1 ;;:- = m;;:- - f ( a0 + a1 a)
Substi tuti ng  for b0 + b1 u from ( 2 . Z6 b ) i n  ( 2 . 26a ) yi el d s  
( 2 . 27) m [ - m - ]a0 + a1 a = ma - 2 ma - 2 ( a 0 + a1 a )
whi c h  s impl i fi es to 
( 2  .28 ) ao + a l a 2ma a+m 
bo + bl a
Notice  i t  fol l ows from ( 2 .28 ) and  ( 2 .8) that E x1 and E x2 are equal to. n1 n2 
the equ i l i bri um i nve stment l evel  for the case of compl ete certa i nty .  Thi s 
establ i shes,  
Propos i ti on 2 . 3 Gi ven our as sumptions, i n  equ i l i bri um the exante l evel 
of expected i nvestment and output for each fi rm equal s the i nvestment­
ou tpu t l evel s obta i ned for the compl ete certai n ty ca se . 
Hence ,  on average , i nves tment and output deci s ion s are unaffected 
by the i n troduct ion  of uncerta i nty i nto our model of commi tment. The 
same equ i val ence resul t hol ds when we i ntroduce uncerta i nty i nto our 
noncommi tment model . Further, i t  can be s hown that ( deta i l s  are not 
presented here) the qual i tati ve d i fferences between the commi tment and 
noncomm i tment equ i l i bri a as i nd i cated i n  Tabl e 1 rema i n  under con d i t i ons  
of u ncerta i nty . 
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III SYMMETRIC CASE 
Th i s  s ec t i on and the  one to fol l ow exam i ne how market s tructure 
and performance are affected by the accuracy and the  degree of overl a p  
there i s  i n  t h e  i nformation  fi rms recei ve. W e  assume  that fi rms on ly  
process,  but do not c hoose t he amount  or  type of i nforma t ion  that  they 
observe . However ,  in real i ty the i nformation envi ronment that fi rms 
work i n  i s  not exogenous but i t  i s  partical l y  shaped by pu bli c pol i cy .  
Al so , in  some  i ndustri es i nformat i on fl ows are col l ectivel y control l ed 
by the  fi rms themsel ves , t hrough their advocacy of d i scl osure l aws , the 
materi al  they provid e  to trade journal s ,  and thei r  parti c i pati on  and 
i nfl uence on  ex ternal and sel f pol i c i ng regu l atory bod i es . The resu l ts 
to fol l ow i nc l ude some predi ct ive content about the i nformation regimes 
1 8 
we are l i ke ly  to observe and some impl i cations  for po l ic i es for manipul ati ng 
the structure and fl ow of i n formation  to improve market performance . The 
remai nder of thi s s ect ion  i nvesti gates s i tuations  where al l market 
partic i pants have equal  access to i nfo rmation . Section  IV exam i nes the 
effects of i n formation  a symmetri es on market organi zation and performance . 
To begi n, we assume that fi rms have the same pri or bel i efs a bout a 
and they rec ei ved i denti cal l y  d i stri buted s i gna l s .  For thi s  s i tuati on  fi rms 
l and 2 use  the same i nvestment function,  
( 3 .1 ) Xi ( ni ) = a 0 + a 1 n;
where 
( 3 . 2 )  _ [ 2m 2m;\ Jao = u 2+m - 2+my
l , 2 
al 
2mA 
2+m Y 
2 I 2 2 I and I. = o / ( o  + o ) and y "' e: Cl 
2 I 2' 2 ( o  + cr1 2l/ ( cr  + cr ) are common Cl Cl e: 
to both fi rms. Note tha t a 2 '  i s  the vari ance of a as precei ved by theCl 
fi rms . We w i l l assume that a l t hough fi rms know the mean of a, they may 
1 9 
for exampl e ,  have rel ati vely diffus e priors on a i f  thei r i n i ti a l  i nformati on 
2' 2 i s  poor. Norma l l y  however we wi l i  a ssume oa = oa · 
<It i s  easy to veri fy that a0 .. "d a 1 are nonnegati ve. Furthermore, from
Propos it ion  2.3  we know 
function i s  depi cted i n  
affected by vari ations  
that a0 + a1 Ci" = E ( Xi ) = X. A typical  i nvestment
Fi g. l a .  Whi l e  the mean val ue  of i nvestment i s  un­
in  0� 1, f{.2 and 01 2 the coeffi c i ents of the  i nvestment
funct ion  a0 and a1 are nontri v i a l  functi ons of these parameters, and hence do
change w ith  parameter s h i fts . Thus s h i fts i n  0� 1, a� and 01 2 cau se rotati ons
of the i nvestment function around the poi n t  (X, Ci") as  depi cted i n  F i g. l b . 
Xi
2mCi" 
7+ii1 
Fi gure l A  
-a ni 
xi
2m� 
2+m 
Fi gure 1 8 
ni -a 
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In markets where var ( X1 -x2 ) i s  l arge we are more l i ke ly  to observ e  firms
of d i fferent s i zes  with  one producer control l i ng most of  the sal es . Expost, 
one cou l d  i nfer that t h i s  market i s  dom i nated by a l eadi ng f irm who had a 
first mover advantage. In contrast to thi s v i ew, we are tryi ng  to i denti fy 
stochastic  env i ronments that produce asymmetric market equ i l i bri a when 
producers start out be i ng strategi cal l y  equ i val ent .  We note from above, that 
the observ ed d i fferences i n  fi rm s i zes as measured by i nv estment or capac ity 
are a pt to be greater t han  the resu l ti ng i nter-firm d i fference i n  market 
product ion  s hares . 
The equations  for our fi v e  vari abl es of i nterest are gi ven by ( 3 . 2 )  and 
( 3 . 3 ) 
( 3.4 ) 
( 3 . 5 )  
var ( X1 - x2 ) 
2 2 )= 2a1 ( cre: - 01 2 
11 = l 
rn 
cs = l rn 
[ (-2 2 ) (- - 2 )1 2 a +  oa + 24 aX + a1 cra 
2 2 2 
J- 34 a1 oe: - 18 a1 cr1 2 [ (-2 2 ( - 2 )1 6 Cl + cr(l ) + 32 ax + al cra 
( 3 . 6 )  TS = i;T + CS
-2 2 2 )- 52 ( X + a1 cr a 
-2 2 2 2 2] + l 6X + Ba1 ( cr1 2 + cr e:) + l 6a1 cra 
The ex pre s s i ons  for TI", CS and are deri ved i n  Append ix  A. 
Illa Affects of Increases  i n  the Percei ved and Actual Vari ance of a 
Here we cons i der the comparati v e  stat ic  effects of changes i n  the 
I n  what fol l ows we study comparati ve stat ic  changes i n  ( 1) the i nvestment actual vari ance, o2, and the percei ved variance, 02
1
, of a on  our vari abl esa a 
functi on, ( 2) var ( X1 -x2 ) ,  ( 3 )  expected ( exa nte ) profi ts,;, ( 4 )  expected
consumer surpl us,  CS, and ( 5 )  expected total s urpl us, TS , for vari ati ons 
i n  the stoc hastic  env i ronments caused by s h i fts i n  cra
2', cre:
2 and cr1 2 . The
second vari abl e, var ( X1 -x2 ) measures the d i s pers i o n  in equ i l i brium i nvestment
or pl ant s i z e .  From ( 2 . 6 )  i t  i s  apparent that var ( q1 -q2} = 
1 /4 var ( X1 -x2 ) .
of i nterest . In al l bu t  one i nstance, we a ssume that producers know the 
actual d i stri bution of a and that 2 2 '  0 = 0 a a Our res u l ts are summari zed i n:
Proposition l_J_ Given our assumptions, 
a) dal > 0 � 2� dcra.
1 im a1cr 2 + 0 a. 
b) dvar ( X1 - X2 )
2
> 0 
dcr a.
c) d1! > a 
d 2 cr a. 
d) d;;: 
dcr 2' a. I < 0 2' 
cr = cr a. a. 
e) dCS 
2 > O dcr a.
f) dT� > 0
dcr a.
2 
0 lim a = 0 
cr 2 ->-"' o 
a. 
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The proof of Proposition 3 . 1 appears in Appendix B. The rest of 
our comparative static results which, like Proposition 3 . 1 , are proved by
straightforward differentiation of l 3 . 2 ) - l 3 . 6 )  will be stated without proof.
Details of the proofs are available from the authors. 
Part a of the Proposition is schematically represented in the Figure 
below. When cr2 = O producers have precise knowledge of a. Hence the signalCJ, 
n; is uniformative and it is ignored by the firms when choosing investment. 
As a� increases, prior knowledge of a becomes less precise, and the firms
pay greater attention to their signals in that their investment schedules 
becomes more responsive to variations in their signals.
x. 
1 
Figure 2 
cr2 = "'
"/' u / 
\ cr2 = 0 
l /I 
CJ, 
v 
I tl; 
Ci" 
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According to part b we are more likely to observe significant differences 
in firm size, and a higher concentration of production going to the largest 
firm, in markets that are subject to more demand uncertainty. The intuitive 
explanation is that as cr 2 increases, firms place greater importance on theira. 
private signals in choosing investment. To the extent that producers receive 
different information from their signals they are more likely to select different 
firm sizes. 
Part c indicates that expected profits are larger in markets subject to 
more exogenous uncertainty. Together part b and part c also suggests that 
one is likely to find a correlation between market concentration as measured 
by differences in firm sales(or size)and average profitability. 
Part d locally characterizes how expected profits vary as the firms' 
prior beliefs about a become less precise. A lack of experience or 
errors in orocessino data may exolain why firms don ' t know 
the act11a 1 rli stri but ion of demand . Expected profits 
(calculated using the true vari;ince a2) a fall ;it l east over
a small range, if producers lack confidence in their prior estimates 
of a so that cr2
1 
> o2 . On the other hand, expected profits will be 
a a 
higher when firms mistakenly ascribe too much precision to their estimates 
of a. 
Parts e and f show that expected consumer surplus and total 
1 . . h . l . 2' 2) surp us increase wit greater uncertainty assuming o a = o a . Part e
is reminiscent of.the result in the economics of uncertainty literature, 
that consumer surplus increases with greater variation in demand. 
IIIb Affects of Variations in Signalling Precision and Correlation 
Our information structure is characterized by the precision of the 
demand signal and the degree of correlation there is between the informa­
tion received by the independent firms. 
In order to isolate the effects of varying signal precision on 
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market equilibria we first assume there is zero correlation in the error 
terms, 012 = 0. In this instance, firm specific information on demand is
being drawn from independent populations of consumers. As o� ranges from
zero to infinity the signal goes from identifying a exactly to being 
completely uniformative. The effects of variations in the information 
content of the signal are summarized in, 
Proposition 3.2: Given our assumptions1and that 012 = 0,
a. 
b. 
cta1 -< 0 
d 2 o e: 
1 im a1 = O i 1 im a0 = Oo 2-+00 o 2.;.QE: E: 
dvar(.x1 - x2) > 0 2 � �2 0o > 
d 2 < o e: 
lim varlX1- X2J2 o _,. 0E: 
0 
as o e: > E: 
lim vartx1- x2J2 CJ ..,. 00 E: 
0 
c. 
d. 
e. 
ct;- ;; 0--2 < doe: 
ct cs < 0 -2-doe: 
ct1s 0 --2 <doe: 
as o e:
2 � 
> 
::: 2 
0 e: 
� 2 cr e: > 0 
As expected, a1 decreases as the signal becomes less informative.
According to part a of the proposition the signal is ignored by the firms 
in making investment decisions in the limit as a� tends to infinity.
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The var( X1-x2) is first increasing than decreasing as a function of oe:
2
according to part b. In particular there is a critical amount of signal 
noise, � 2 which will generate the largest observed interfirm differencese: 
in investment and production. Note that extremely noisy signals do not 
produce large expost differences between producers, because they ignore the 
signals and make decisions based solely on prior information that they 
have in common about the distribution of a. 
Part c implies that the firms are collectively better off receiving 
information with some amount of imprecision. This means that the collective 
value of better information may be negative; if both firms must receive 
signals with the same degree of precision, then, if possible, they will opt 
for at least some noise in information they acquire. In section IV we 
examine the value of information to a single firm who is able to unilaterally 
increase the precision of his signal. 
As in the previous Proposition, parts b and c suggest a correlation 
between industry profitability and concentration as measured by inter-firm 
differences in investment or production. 
Finally, we see that consumers are made worse off as producers receive 
less informative signals. Note that parts d and e indicate that while there 
might be public support for improving the information flows in the market 
the value of better information to the firms might well be negative. 
The other factor affecting equilibria is the correlation between 
information signals the firms receive. The signal on a that each firm 
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b. 
c. 
dvar(X1 -x2)
dol2
d1T 
do12 
< 0 
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< 0 
observes is obscured by an error term, ei. When 012 > 0 both firms may be
d. dCS
do12
< 0 
obtaining information by sampling from the same or similar populations. In the 
negative correlation case producers may be sampling from groups that are e. dTS
do1 2 
< 0 
affected in opposite ways by a common occurrence (for example, a rise in 
the price of gasoline may cause opposite demand responses in the domestic 
and foreign travel industries). The correlation coefficient between n 1 and2 
n2 is given by p = 
0a + 012 
02+02 e; a 
where \ o12 \ < oe:
2 As 01 2
becomes positive and large in absolute value, two things happen. First, 
both firms tend to observe the same signal. In a loose sense the total 
information available for updating estimates of o2 decreases This is a . 
made more precise when we analyze the effects of information pooling between 
two firms. Second, since the firms are strategically equivalent, differences 
in information are the only source of variation in their investment-output 
decisions. As their signals become more (positively) correlated the firms 
expost decisions become more alike, and they tend to mimic each other. As 
012 tends to - o:, the correlation between signals diminishes and may be 
negative if o 2 is large relative to o 2 In this case the decisions of thee: a 
producers may become uncorrelated or even negatively correlated. The effect 
of these changes on our summary variables is characterized in 
Proposition 3.3: Given our assumptions, 
a. 
da1 
dcrl2 
< 0
The results of part a and particularly part b are expected. Part a 
implies that producers become more cautious in acting on new information as 
their signals become better correlated. A producer observing a high value 
for n is less apt to invest heavily because he suspects that it is likely 
that his competitor has also probably observed an optimistic demand signal. 
Parts b and c again suggest that industry profitability and con­
centration are correlated. In this instance there seems to be a direct link 
between the variance of the differences in firm sizes and the magnitude of 
our welfare measures. It can be shown that as 01 2 increases1the variation in
total investment and total output increases.1 4 The reason for this is that
firms mimic each other's decisions as their signals become better correlated. 
Hence they reinforce each other's errors, so that an unusually optimistic 
lpessimistic) demand signal will result in both firms over (under) investing 
in plant capacity. Recall that according to Proposition 2.2 the expected 
value of total output is invariant to changes in 012. This means that 
an increase in signal correlation produces a mean preserving spread of the 
di�tribution of total output. Hence expected total revenues and expected 
consumer surplus will decrease because they are concave functions of total 
output. 
27 
Another way to view the role of signal correlation in our model is 
that all parties involved benefit when producers coordinate their decisions. 
If producer 1 plans for a large output, producer 2 should plan for a small 
one, and vice-versa so as to reduce unnecessary variations in total supply. 
This synchronization occurs atuomatically when the demand signals are 
negatively correlated. A more dramatic illustration of this principle is a 
four way traffic light. Motorists heading in the north-south direction and 
those going in the east-west direction must synchronize; one group goes while 
the other group is stopped in order to avoid collision or costly delay. The 
traffic light provides the two groups of motorists with perfect negatively 
correlated signals. 
One implication of our discussion above is that poor information is 
most troublesome to producers when their signals are positively correlated. 
Misleading signals about demand cause both firms to error in the same 
direction. When firms receive· independent or negatively correlated information 
the impact of increases in signal variance is less clear as implied by 
Propositi-0n 3.2 and our preceding discussion. The next two Propositions 
compare the impact of increasing signal noise on equilibria for two polar 
cases where the signal errors are perfect positively and negatively correlated. 
Proposition 3.4: Given our assumptions and 012 = oE
2 for all values of oE
2. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
da 1-- < 0 
do 2E 
dvar(X1-X2)
do 2E 
d-; < 0 
do 2E 
dCS < 0 
dOE
2
dTS 
< 0da""2 E 
0 
Proposition 3.5: Given our assumptions, and 012 
of o 2E 
(a) 
(b) 
{c) 
{d) 
(e) 
da1-- < 0 
d 2 OE 
dvar(x1-x2)
do 2E 
d:;i° 
ci7 >E 
dCS < --2 do E 
dTS < = --2 > do E
> 0 
0 
0 
0 for 2� A 2 . 0 2 > 00 0 E > E ' E 
2 o for all valuesE 
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Notice that the incentives for producers to jointly increase the inform-
ativeness of their signals depends on the degree of overlap in their infor­
mation. Producer profits decrease with less signalling precision when they 
share common information. This suggests that producers may become better 
informed (assuming further information can be acquired) in markets where 
they have access to the same information. In such markets, information has 
public good characteristics because it benefits all parties involved. For 
that reason, information is likely to be underprovided if it is acquired 
privately by producers or by consumers who make it available (at no cost) to 
producers for their own use. 
In contrast, the collective value of information to producers is always 
negative when signal noises are negatively correlated. Notice that, as 
before, var(X1-x2) and expected profits vary together, and for the case at
hand they are both decreasing as oE
2 gets small. This implies that producers
are better off when they can maintain large systematic differences in their 
exposit investment-output decisions. If the firms are strategically equivalent 
only differences in information can maintain a separation in decisions. 
Collectively, producers will resist programs to enhance the information 
they receive, whereas consumer groups will favour such attempts. 
III.d Affects of Information Pooling 
This section examines the incentives for producers to share private 
information with each other in order to obtain better demand estimates, 
assuming that they don't collude in making decisions. This analysis is 
motivated by the interesting work by Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) on 
information pooling. They identify instances where sharing information is 
individually and jointly profitable for firms who can observe multiple in­
dependently distributed signals on demand. Our analysis differs most 
importantly from Novshel< and Sonnenschein by allowing varying degrees of 
correlation to exist between the pooled signals. In particular we find that 
the incenti'ves for sharing information diminishes as the correlation between 
signals decreases and becomes negative. 
Our results follow directly from Propositions 3.2 and 3.5 once we 
specify how information pooling transforms each firm's decision problems. 
First, a producer's estimate of demand becomes more precise when information 
is pooled (unless 0
12 
= o
E
2 and the signals are identical, a possibility
we shall ignore). For example, if 0
12 
= 0 so that the signal errors are
uncorrelated, and firms pool their information then (see DeGroot p. 167) 
the updated distribution for a is normal with mean equal to 
A A 2 
( 3. 7) E ( a In ) = Cl + A' ( n - Ci") ; A' = � 
a 2 + o 212 a E 
n1 + n2 n = --
2 
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and variance (o 2o 2/2)/(o 2 + a 212). When firms can observe their owna E a E 
signal only, the conditional distribution of a is normal with mean value 
given by (2.12) and variance equal to (o 2o 2)/(o 2 + o 2). Comparinga E a E 
(2.12) and (3.7) we see that it is as if each firm is able to observe a 
signal with one half of the error variance when they share information. 
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If the signal errors are perfect negatively correlated, the gains in 
estimation precision to information pooling are even more dramatic; the firms 
can exactly determine� by computing n = nl + n2 = 2a = a .  
2 2 
A second effect of information pooling is to cause the expost decisions 
of the firms to coincide15. This combined with the first effect, that of
increasing the precision of demand forecasts, determines the overall impact 
of sharing information. When 0
12 = -oE
2 it follows from Proposition 3.4 that
the impact of information pooling which eliminates demand uncertainty 
entirely, is characterized by 
Proposition 3.6: Given our assumptions, and 0
12 
(a) np < 11 
( b) csP > cs 
-p> - 2 < A2 (c) TS = TS for o = a < E > E 
" 2 a > 0 
E 
2 
-o thenE 
(where the superscript "p" denotes quantities derived under a information 
pooling equilibrium). 
When 01
2 
= 0, information sharing may increase profits by providing
firms with more exact demand estimates, but it will simultaneously decrease 
profits by causing decisions to coincide. To determine the overall impact 
we compare equations (2. 1 2) and (3.7). In effect when producers agree 
to share information they move from a situation where 012 = 0 and their
signal errors equals o� to one where 012 = o�/2, and the signal error
equals 02/ 2. If one totally differentiates the expressions for n, CSE 
and TS with respect to o� and 012 allowing o� to decrease from o� to o�/2 
while 01 2 increases at the same rate from o to o�/2 and integrates, one
obtains the following characterization, 
Proposition 3.7: Given our assumptions and 01 2 = 0,
{a) 
{b) 
(c) 
:;rP < 1T 
_p -cs > cs 
_p -
TS > TS 
Again we find that producers are worse off ex ante when they act on 
common information obtained from pooling their signals. We have two 
observations to make here. First, although there may be social gains to 
allowing the firms to exchange information, producers prefer to maintain 
private information if they are prohibited from colluding in making 
investment and output decisions. It is at least conceivable that in a 
second best world that producers should be allowed to make joint invest­
ment and output decisions to induce them to pool their information. 
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Second, we have only examined ex ante information pooling in which 
producers agree to reveal their demand signals before knowing what they are. 
Expost information sharing would allow the firms to first observe their 
signal and then to decide whether or not they wanted to share it with 
their competitors. This would amount to a simple type of information 
transmission between firms. It would consist of a binary choice; a 
firm would either send or not send a message to its competitor, and 
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if the message were sent it would simply contain the value of the deamnd 
signal. This and other forms of strategic information exchange are 
studied in our companion paper, Harris and Lewis {1 982). 
IV ASYMMETRIC CASE 
Here we suppose that firms differ in how informed they are. 
One producer may receive a more precise demand signal than the other, 
or he may have a more accurate appraisal of the prior distribution 
for a. In the first instance, it is common knowledge among the firms 
that one of them is better informed. In the latter case the less 
33 
informed firm may not be aware of his relative ignorance. As before, 
we assume that producers hold correct expectations about the mean value 
of a. Hence information asymmetries between the players are reflected 
by differences in the signal variances, o 2•s 
Ei 
view of the dispersion of a, denoted by o� 
and each firm's subjective
2 2 When o = o then player ai a 
i is accurately informed about the true distribution of a. 
The natural question to ask here is what is the private and social 
value of information, as one firm becomes relatively better informed. 
Similar inquiries have been conducted by Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) 
and by Palfrey (1982) as well as by other authors in the context of models 
of signalling, adverse selection, bidding and delegation. The interest in 
this subject was motivated by a, what is now no longer a novel result, 
that the private value of information may actually be negative. A crucial 
assumption for this result to hold is that information can not be freely 
disposed of, otherwise individuals could avoid harm from more information 
by simply ignoring it. In adversarial situations, this constraint on free 
disposal seems warranted. It may be difficult for one player to convince 
another that he will not use information he has acquired. Of course when 
information is only obtained at a cost, players can remain credibly uninformed 
by not purchasing information. The analysis to follow makes some 
comparisons of the ex ante profitability of differently informed firms 
assuming that information flows can not be altered. This is data that 
firms would need to know if they could affect their knowledge by 
acquiring information. 
The expected profit for firms l and 2 for the case of asymmetric 
information is given respectively by 
( 4.1 a) 
( 4 . 1 b) 
l c ( -2 2 - - 2 ITl = 128 l 2 a + oa ) + 24 ( a  X) + (36a 1-12b1)o a
-2 2 2 2 2] -54X - 18a1 b1 012 - 37a1 oe:1 + 3b1 oe:2 
l [ ,- 2 2 - -) ) 2rr2 = 128 12 a +oa ) + 24(a X + (36b1 - 12a1 o a 
_2 2 2 2 2] -54X - 18a1 b1 012 - 37b1 oe:2 + 3a1 oe:1
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(These expressions are derived following the method outlined in Appendix A, 
assuming that the firms have different investment functions). 
Our first result outlines the effects on the expected profits of the 
two firms of variations in the precision of one of the producer's signal. 
Totally differentiating (4 .1) with respect to o2 and o2 andEl E2
using (2.21) we obtain the. following local results. 
Proposition 4. 1 Given our assumptions, 
a) 
( i) 
If o ai
2 
drri
doe:i
2 \20 
e: i 
o 2 for i = 1, 2, thena 
< 0 
20 e: 
j 
(ii) drri
doe:/ l 20 
e: i 
> 0 
i , j=l, 2 20 
e: j 
(b) 
(c) 
If cr2
ll i 
( i) drri
dcr 
e: j 
If () = Cti
( i) drri
2 2() . () ll e: i 
' > 0 
2 and() ll 
> 0 
---acr-2 
e: j 
0, and er 2 > O for i, j=l, 2 then
e:j 
< 0 
(ii) drrj 
do ' 
e: j 
2 then 0: = + 00 llj
(ii) dn. __J_ dcr 2 
e: j 
< 0 
According to part ta) small asymmetries in information benefit the firm 
with the more precise demand signal. This also seems to hold when there 
are large differences in signal variances according to numerous numerical 
examples that we have looked at, though we haven't tried to establish 
this analytically because of the complicated algebra involved. Parts 
b and c deal with extreme cases; one in which one of the agents receives 
exact knowledge of demand by observing his signal, and another in which 
one of the players is initially completely uniformed about the distri­
bution of demand. In both instances, the expected profit of the in­
formed (uninformed) producer is increasing (decreasing in the signal 
variance of the uninformed firm. Proposition 4. 1 suggests that in a 
model of information acquisition, becoming better informed than your 
opponent would be a dominant strategy. However as Propositions (3.2) 
and (3.5) suggest, producers might be made worse off if they botn were to 
become better informed. The producers thus would be facing a type of 
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prisoner's dilemma in the acquisition of information. 
Our final result illustrates that a small amount of ignorance about 
the prior distribution of demand can be beneficial for a producer. 
Specifically we have 
Proposition 4.2: Given our assumptions, and o2 = o2 for i = 1. 2ai a 
difi a- 2 
o ai 
> 0 
dif. 
_J 
d 2 oa.l 
< 0 'f j 
According to Proposition 4. 2 we suppose that the firms hold slightly 
different beliefs about the distribution of demand and that firm i is 
misinformed in ascribing an overly diffuse prior to a. The divergence in 
beliefs may result because of interfirm differences in experience, and in 
processing information. In this case, ex ante expected profits are larger 
for the misinformed firm. 16 This suggests that an informed firm could
deliberately act as though it were uninformed about the prior distribution 
of a in order to affect higher profits. This behavior is ruled out in 
the current analysis because we assume that firms are strategically 
equivalent and that one producer can not misrepresent his beliefs or 
preferences in order to achieve a more favorable outcome for himself .17 
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V .  CONCLUSI ONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have taken the approach that observed d i fferences i n  firm s ize 
an d market share may be explained by producers having access to different 
information at the time of their i nvestment deci sions . We have analyzed 
the equili bri um properties of a; duopoly production model where each firm 
commits i tself to a production plan based on proprietary i nformati on 
about future market conditions. Because our analysis  pertains to a 
parti cular example the conclusions we deri ve are regarded as only 
provisi onal, an d  are perhaps at least suggestive of what one mi ght find  
in  a more general analys i s .  
The pri mary i mpli cations of our model are : 
l. Industry output and the capaci ty of each firm i ncreases when firms
can compete for market share by precommiting themselves to a level of
i nvestment. Strategic precommitment may enhance overal l i ndustry
performance although i t  reduces producti ve efficiency .
2. One i s  likely to observe large expost differences in firm size in
i ndustries ·where there i s  significant market uncertainty , and firms 
receive moderately accurate pri vate estimates of demand which are 
uncorrelated or negatively correlated with each other . In these
i ndustr i es we also expect to fi nd a higher level of profits on
average.
3. In the symmetri c  case , when firms are equally informed and they
observe similar data , expected industry profits i ncrease as infor­
mation becomes more accurate . Recei ving more exact information has
the opposite effect on industry profits when the firms observe
negati vely correlated information signals . Overall , industry
performance tends to i mprove with better access to i nformation , so 
that an argument can be made for publi cly prov i ded informati on i n  
this i nstance. 
4 .  Under the conditi ons of our model , firms will resi st sharing their  
pri vate i nformation wi th each other , when they can ' t  collude on 
production . 18 I nstead , i f  possi ble , each firm wil l try to i ncrease
i ts stock of proprietary i nformation , since better i nformed firms 
earn hi gher profi ts on average . 
Our model can be extended i n  several di rections to capture certai n  
i mportant real world complexi ti es that we ' ve ignored . Fi rst , it would 
seem strai ghtforward to generali ze the analysi s  to the case of N > 2 
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producers . Second, we could exam i ne other modes of precommi tment besi des 
i nvestment. For example, fi rms mi ght select the degree of production 
flexibil ity based on thei r pri vate forecasts of future conditions to 
secure a larger share of the market. Thi rd , we mi ght endogenize the 
acqui siti on of i nformation as i n  Matthews ( 1979 )  and Milgrom ( 1981) 
Our current analysi s  suggests that there will be a proliferati on of 
i nformati on gathering , possi bly to the detriment of all producers , 
when i nvestment in i nformati on becomes a strategi c vari able. Fi nally, 
the possibili ty that firms can exchange their  pri vate i nformation expost 
after observing it as in Crawford and Sobel (1982) i s  the subject of 
our compan ion paper. 
APPENDI X A 
Deri vati on  of Var ( x1 -x2 ) ,  IT, CS, and TS for the Symmetri c Case
Deri vation  of Var ( X1 -X2 )
(Al ) VAR( X1 -x2 ) = VAR ( a 1 (:n 1 -n2 ) )
VAR ( a1 n 1 - a1 n2 )
2 2 a1 E ( n1 --n2 ) 
2 2 2 a 1 E ( n 1 + n2 - 2n1 n2 l
2 2 2 2 2a 1 ( oa + 0€ -
oa - 0 1 2 )
2 2 ) 2al (0€ - 01 2 
Deri vat ion of n
From ( 2 . 7 ) and the fact that Xi = a0 + a1 n i ' our  expression for expected
profi t i s  
(A2 )  n = 118 E [ 1 2a2 +3 6 ( a ( a0+a1 (a+E1 ) ) - 1 2a (a 0+a1 (a+€2 ) )
-1 8 ( a0+a1 ( a+E1 ) ) ( a 0+a 1 ( a+€ 2 ) )
2 2 ]-37 ( a0+a1 ( a+E 1 ) )  + 3 ( a0+a1 ( a+E2 ) )  
= l [ -2 2 -128 1 2 ( a  +oa ) + 3bE ( a ( a0+a1 a ) ) - l 2 ( a ( a0+a1 a ) )
2 2 
-1 8E ( a 0+a 1 a )  - 1 Ba 1 E ( E 1 € 2 )
2 2 2 -37E ( a0+a1 a )  - 37a 1 E ( E 1 ) 
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l= 128 
2 2 2 l +3 E ( a0+a1 a )  + 3 a1 E ( € 2 ) 
l -2 2 - - 2 - 2 2 2 1 2 ( a  + o ) + 24 (a  X + a1 o ) - 52 ( X  + a o ) a a l a 
2 2 2 ]- 34a1 0€ - 1 Ba1 01 2
Deri vat i on of CS
Given q1 , q2 .and a con sumer surpl u s ,  CS , i s
(A3 } CS = 
q +q 
f
l 2 ( a- Z ) dZ - (a-ql -q2 ) ( ql +q2 ) 
0 
a ( ql +q2 )
2 2 ( ql +q2 ) - a ( ql +q2 ) + ( ql +q2 ) 
2 ( ql +q2 ) 
2 
-2-
} [ f + I x(', > r 
l [a2 a ( Xl +X2 ) 
2 4 + 4 
( from 2 .  6 )  
+ 
( Xl +X2 )
2 ]
1 6 
1 28  
[ 1 6a2 + 1 6a l x1 +X, I + 4 I X1 +X/ j 
Now the ex pected val ue  o f  CS i s  g i ven by, 
4Q 
(A4) cs E ( CS)= 1�8 [1 6a.2 + 1 6a. ( 2 ( a 0+a1 a. )  + a1 ( E 1 +E 2 ) )
+ 4 ( 2 (  a0+a1 a. )  + a1 ( E l +E2 ) }
2 ] 
1 1 6 (a. +cr ) + 32 (a.  X + a1 a ) + 1 6 ( X  +a 1 cr )
[ -2 2 - - 2 -2 2 2 
rn a. a. a. 
+Bal 
2 ( crE
2 + cr1 2 )] 
Deri vati on of TS
I t  fol l ows immed i atel y that 
{A5) TS = 2rr + CS
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( Bl ) 
( B2 )  
APPENDI X B 
Proof of Prorio s i ti on 3 . 1 
Part a 
da 1 
�2 = 
a. 
Pa rt b
2m 
2m 
[( 2<my ) d>. 
dcr 2a. 
>.m 
� ]- dcr a. 2
( 2 + my ) 2
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�2 
a. 
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( B4 )  
( B 5 )  
( B 6 )  
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Footnotes 
1 .  For exampl e see Sal o p  l l 98l ) .  
2 .  There are of  course games where mov i ng first i s  a l i abi l i ty .  
See Moul i n  ( 1 981 ) for a character izat i on  o f  order o f  pl ay advanta ges  
i n two perso n games . 
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3 . The approach to expl ai ni ng market evol ution by l ooki ng  to di fferences 
in private i n formation  among strate gi cal l y  equ i val ent fi rms i ns tead 
of  the fi rst mover paradi gm i s  al so  fo l l owed by Jovanovi c ( 1 981 ) i n  
the context o f  a strate g i c  l ocation model and  by Novs hek and Sonnen­
sche i n  ( 1 982 ) i n  the i r  study Cournot Duopo ly  wi th i n formati on  pool i n g .  
A di fferent app roach t o  embel i s hi ng the exi s ti ng  fi rst mover model s 
suggested by Spul ber ( 1 981 ) and addressed by Appl ebaum and Lim ( 1 982 ) 
i s  to as sume that the fi rm mov i n g  fi rst i s  pa rti a l l y  uni nfo rmed about 
future market conditi ons . 
4 .  Our anal ysi s  d i ffers from Novshek and Sonnensc hei n ( 1 982 ) i n  that we 
assume fi rms make a strateg i c  commi tment before they make output  deci s i ons . 
5 .  Crawford and Sobel ( 1 982 ) contai n a n  i nteresti ng  di scussion  o f  games o f
di s cl osure i n  a context qui te di fferent from ours . 
6 .  Equati on ( 2 . 2 b )  conforms to the as sumpti ons used  i n  a vari ety o f  model s
of R & D .  See Dasguptz ( 1 982 ) for a di scuss ion  of  these mode l s .
7 . When Xi and qi are cho sen s i mul taneousl y ,  o
ur model reduces to the
Novs hek and Sonnenschei n  ( 1 982 ) model . Looki ng at  ( 2 . 3 ) it i s  apparent
that se l ecti n g  x.  = q · i s  optimal . Re fer to Novshek and Son nenschei nl l 
a ( 1 982 p g . 21 6 )  for a proof that qi = ll/ 3 .
8 .  I n  terms of the di fferenti a l  games l i terature , the noncommi tment equ i l i bri um 
corresponds to the p l ayers choos i n g  "open l oo p "  strategi es whereas 
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" feedback strategi es"  a re chosen i n  the perfect commi tment equi l i bri a .  
The concept o f  perfectness i s  due to Setten ( 1 975 ) ,  an e l aborati on  o f  
the perfectness requi rement i n  s equenti a l  games appears i n  Kreps and 
Wi l son ( 1 982 ) 
9 .  The consumer s u rpl us meas u re i s  taken as the area under the demand 
curve minus  the total cos t of purchas i n g  q1 + q2 to the consume r .
1 0. The resu l ts that ( a ) i nvestment and output i ncrease , ( b )  profi ts 
decl i n e  and ( c )  consumer s u rpl us ri ses as a resu l t of commi tment hol d 
un der rather general condi ti ons . See Nea ry ( 1 982 ) .  
1 1 . The notion o f  Bayes i a n  Equ i l i bri um i s  due to Ha rsanyi ( 1 968 ) .  Other 
1 2 . 
names for th i s  equ i l i bri um concept are Sel f Ful l fi l l i ng o r  Rati onal 
Expectati ons Equ i l i bri a .  
2 2 2When o - 1 o , oa ai ai i 
( 2 .  l a ) and ( 2 .  l�) .
l 2 . rep aces oa i n  the expressi ons for Ai and Ji i n
1 3 .  We are assumi ng  that fi rms are ri s k  neutral . Pal frey ( 1 982 ) conta i ns 
an i nteresti ng  analys i s  of the impacts of ri s k  avers ion  on equi l i br i a  
i n  competi ti ve s i tuati ons . 
1 4 .  The var ( X 1 + x2 ) = 2a1 ( oa
2 
+ 01 2 ) .  Di fferenti ati ng th i s  expressi on
wi th respect to  01 2 reveal s that  var  ( X1 + x2 ) i s  i ncreasi ng in  01 2 .
The var ( q1 + q2 ) = � 6 var  ( X1 + x2 ) .
1 5. Thi s as sumes that o 2 = o2 for i = l , 2 and that fi rms do not al so ai a 
acqu i re some pri ve  i n fo rmati o n  as i n  Novs hek  and Sonnensche i n .  
1 6 .  Exante pro fi ts a re cal cul ated as i n  ( 4 .  l ) usi n g  the actual vari ance o f  
a o a
2 
1 7 . See Sobel ( 1 g31 ) for an i nteresti ng d i scu s s s i on o f  th i s  behavi or 
i n  the context of bargai ni ng . 
1 8 .  See Novshek and Sonnensche i n  { 1 982 ) for cases where i n formati on pool i n g  
i s  mutua l l y  benefici al . 
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